The U.S. Navy Is About to Lose Over 600 Tomahawk Missiles

The Navy is set to retire four submarines that together carry over six hundred Tomahawk missiles, and there is no clear plan to fully replace that firepower anytime soon.

Story Snapshot

Four Ohio-class guided-missile submarines carry up to 154 Tomahawks each, a huge share of undersea strike power.
The Navy plans to retire these boats between 2026 and 2028, cutting hundreds of launch cells at once.
New Virginia-class submarines with the Virginia Payload Module carry far fewer missiles per hull.
Open sources warn of a near-term “missile gap” while official, detailed replacement numbers remain unclear.

What Is Being Retired and Why It Matters

Four Ohio-class guided-missile submarines, known as SSGNs, were converted from nuclear ballistic-missile boats to carry large numbers of conventional cruise missiles. Each SSGN trades its nuclear missiles for 22 tubes that can hold seven Tomahawk land-attack missiles, for a maximum of 154 per submarine. That makes these boats the Navy’s largest undersea missile carriers and gives them more strike power than many surface warships. Together, the four boats can hold more than six hundred Tomahawks, all hidden under the sea.

Retiring all four SSGNs does not just remove ships; it removes dense “magazines” of missiles. Analysts highlight that the four submarines represent roughly half of the submarine force’s vertical launch payload capacity, so their loss reshapes the strike balance of the fleet. This change lands in a world where Americans on the left and right already doubt whether Washington’s planners really put national strength ahead of bureaucratic comfort. Many see another example of decisions made far from public view, with real risks pushed onto ordinary citizens if deterrence fails.

When These Submarines Leave Service

The Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plans show a clear retirement timetable rather than a sudden cut. USS Ohio and USS Florida are scheduled to decommission in fiscal year 2026, while USS Michigan and USS Georgia follow in 2028. Secondary reporting echoes that all four guided-missile boats will be gone from the fleet by the end of 2028. This staggered schedule softens the shock somewhat but still means a large drop in undersea strike capacity over just a two-year window, not over decades.

Supporters of the plan say the retirements are part of normal aging and treaty-driven changes, not a secret plot to weaken America. The original conversions themselves came after arms-control agreements, and the hulls are now old and expensive to keep running. Yet critics argue that knowing about the problem for years makes the lack of a one-for-one replacement even harder to defend. When citizens already think the “deep state” cares more about budget charts than security, a visible missile shortfall looks like proof their worries are justified.

How the Navy Plans to Replace Tomahawk Capacity

The Navy’s chosen answer is the Virginia-class attack submarine, especially the Block V version with the Virginia Payload Module. Earlier Virginia boats carry 12 Tomahawks in their bow vertical launchers, but the module adds an 84-foot section with four big tubes, each holding seven missiles for 28 more. That brings total capacity on a Block V Virginia to about 40 Tomahawks, still far below the 154 carried by an Ohio SSGN. Business press and defense outlets all note this sharp drop in per-boat firepower.

Analysts estimate the Navy would need more than twenty Virginia Payload Module boats to match the launch capacity of the four SSGNs it is retiring. Building that many advanced submarines takes years, and U.S. shipyards are already struggling to meet production goals. For now, there is no official, public accounting that shows how many Block V boats will be delivered and ready during the 2026–2028 window. That gap between bold modernization promises and hard numbers feeds the broader sense that elites talk about “future capabilities” while ignoring near-term risk.

The Emerging “Missile Gap” Debate

Several open-source analyses warn that losing the Ohio SSGNs creates a real capability gap rather than a smooth handoff. One author describes it as a looming “missile gap,” arguing that the Virginia Payload Module offers “significantly less magazine depth” and that industrial labor shortages slow any fix. Another piece calls the loss of 616 launch cells a “gut punch,” saying more than 20 Virginias would be needed to compensate. These are not official Navy statements, but they pull from Navy plans and industry data to raise alarms.

At the same time, other coverage stresses that the retirements are planned and that Virginia-class submarines will “eventually” absorb much of the mission. That argument points out that dispersing missiles across more boats can improve flexibility and survivability. Still, it does not clearly answer the public’s basic question: for the next decade, can America launch as many Tomahawk strikes from under the sea as before? Until the Navy releases transparent numbers, people on both the right and left will see this as one more case where insiders expect trust without proof.

Why This Story Resonates Beyond Military Circles

This submarine issue taps into deeper worries about competence and priorities in Washington. Many conservatives who already blame globalist thinking and wasteful spending see the planned missile shortfall as another example of elites weakening U.S. power while preaching “efficiency.” Many liberals who fear growing inequality and endless wars view the opaque planning as proof that defense decisions happen without honest debate or clear goals. Both sides suspect a system that protects careers first and the country second.

America’s founding ideals assumed transparent, accountable government making hard choices in the open. Instead, citizens now watch huge shifts in military power unfold through leaks, commentary, and scattered press reports. When four submarines that can each carry 154 Tomahawks are retired and no simple replacement is visible, people are right to ask who is minding the store. Whether one calls it a “missile gap” or a transition problem, the core question is the same: is the federal government still capable of long-term planning that truly keeps the nation secure.